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REPLY TO SMILE ASIANS STATEMENT OF FACTS
There was no disputed issue of fact below. The trial court had access to the
entire record of procedural history in this case as part of the court's file. The trial
court examined the history of the parties' participation in this litigation and based its
decision to deny BriteSmile's Motion to Compel Arbitration on its interpretation of
this record. BriteSmile summarized the salient facts of this procedural history in its
opening brief. Brief of Appellee, 3-13. Smile Asia has provided its own summary in
its brief Compare Brief of Appellants, 4-10, with Brief of Appellee, 3-13. There is
no material difference in these two summaries.
ARGUMENT
Neither party takes issue with the two-pronged rule applied by the trial court.
Brief of Appellants, 11; Brief of Appellee, 15-19. This rule was first adopted in this
state in the case of Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah. 833 P.2d 356 (Utah
1992), and subsequently applied in the cases of Pledger v. Gillespie. 1999 UT 54, 982
P.2d 572, Central Florida Invs. v. Parkwest Assocs.. 2002 UT 3, 40 P.3d 599, and
Cedar Surgery Center L.L.C. v. Bonelh. 2004 UT 58, 96 P.3d 911. Under this rale,
arbitration is a favored means for resolving disputes and the parties should be required
to submit to arbitration unless the party opposing arbitration can show:

(1)

Waiver: where the party seeking arbitration has waived its contractual
right to arbitration by substantially^ participating in the Htigation to a
point inconsistent with an intention to arbitrate; and

(2)

Prejudice: where the party opposing arbitration shows that "actual
prejudice" or "real harm" would result if the contract is enforced and the
dispute is sent to arbitration.

Parkwest 2002 UT 3, ^ 20; Chandler. 833 P.2d at 360.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE RULE.

The trial court misapplied this in two ways. First, the trial court failed to
recognize that the burden to prove both of these elements is on the party opposing
arbitration. It was Smile Asia's burden - and a "heavy" one - to demonstrate both
waiver and real prejudice. See Central Florida Invs. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ^
24,40 P.3d 599 (citing Tenneco Resins. Inc. v. Daw Int'l AG. 770 F.2d 416, 420 (5th
Cir. 1985)): see also Britton v. Co-Op Banking Group. 916 F.2d 1405. 1412 (9th Cir.
1990); In re Complaint of Sedco. Inc.. 767 F.2d 1140, 1150 (5th Cir. 1985); Hilti. Inc.
V. Oldach. 392 F.2d 368, 371 (1st Cir. 1968); Font v. Paine Webber Inc.. 649 F. Supp.
462, 466 (D.C.P.R. 1986); Downev v. Christensen. 825 P.2d 557, 389 (Mont. 1992);

1 The word "substantially" is highlighted because it is an important modifier
that qualifies the amount of participation required. In its brief, Smile Asia has
conveniently omitted this modifier from its reference to this rule, ^ee, e ^ . Brief of
Appellee, 16. As discussed in greater detail below, it is not enough that BriteSmile
may have "participated in the litigation," as Smile Asia would have it, but rather the
test requires that such participation be "substantial" and cause actual prejudice before
Smile Asia can avoid its promise to submit to arbitration.

WilHams Industries. Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp.. 110 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tx. App.
2003).
Second, the trial court treated the prejudice prong as if it could be presumed if
the first prong was satisfied. R. 780-81. However, unless both waiver and real
prejudice are established, arbitration is required. Parkwest 2002 UT 3, ]| 5; Chandler.
833 P.2d at 360. Because of this, many courts first ask whether there has been
prejudice and, if not, the analysis ends, and the parties are ordered to arbitration as
required by their contract. See, e.g.. Stockton v. Oppenheimer & Co.. 779 F.2d 885,
887 (2nd Cir. 1985) (arbitration required notwithstanding discovery undertaken by
defendant, motion to dismiss, and eight month delay); Danny's Constr. Co.. Inc. v.
Birdair. Inc.. 136 F.Supp.2d 134, 143-44 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (arbitration required
notwithstanding defendant's motion for particulars and more than one year delay);
Font V. Paine Webber Inc.. 649 F. Supp. 462, 466 (D. P.R. 1986) (arbitration required
notwithstanding discovery efforts, motions to dismiss, counterclaims, and two-year
delay); EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias. 934 S.W.2d 87, 89-90 (Tex. 1996) (arbitration
required notwithstanding scheduling conferences, discovery efforts, deposition,
stipulation to continue trial date, and delay of approximately ten months); Downey v.
Christensen. 825 P.2d 557, 389 (Mont. 1992) (arbitration required notwithstanding
discovery completed and substantial delay); The County of Clark v. Blanchard
Constr. Co.. 653 P.2d 1217, 1219-20 (Nev. 1982) (arbitration required
notwithstanding defendant filing a third-party complaint and participating in
discovery and a nine month delay); Williams Industries. Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp..
3

110 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tx. App. 2003) (arbitration required notwithstanding
discovery, counterclaims, and delay of almost one and one-half years).
It is also important to remember that there is a "strong policy of the law in
Utah in favor of arbitration, [and a] strong presumption against waiver of the right to
arbitrate." Parkwest. 2002 UT 3, ^f 33 & 24. "[A]ny doubts conceming the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Id. Tf 24 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. V. Mercury Constr. Corp.. 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)); see also Stockton v.
Oppenheimer & Co.. 779 F.2d at 887; Envirex. Inc. v. K.H. Schussler Fur
Umwelttechnik GMBH. 832 F. Supp. 1293, 1295 (E.D. Wis, 1993); University
Nursing Assocs. v. Phillips. 842 So.2d 1270, 1277 (Miss 2003), Williams Industries.
Inc. V. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp.. 110 S.W.3d at 135. Smile Asia tries to minimize this
important policy by suggesting that it should not apply unless there has been an "early
exercise of arbitration rights." Brief of Appellee, 26. There is no such exception in
the case law. Like the trial court below, Smile Asia ignores the fact that BriteSmile
did raise and exercise its right to arbitration at the very outset of this litigation by
asserting it as an affirmative defense. R. 34 & 360.
The trial court erred when it concluded that the procedural history of this case
supports a finding of wavier and prejudice.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPLYING A
WAIVER EVEN THOUGH BRITESMILE
ASSERTED ITS RIGHT TO ARBITRATION AS AN
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN ITS ANSWERS.
A.

The Trial Courtis Error.

Smile Asia acknowledges, as it must, that BriteSmile gave notice of its right to
compel arbitration on at least three separate occasions throughout the course of this
litigation: first, at BriteSmile's initial appearance in an affirmative defense on May
30, 2002 (R. 34); second, in BriteSmile's amended answer on July 28, 2003 (R. 360);
and, third, in BriteSmile's Motion to Compel Arbitration on May 24, 2004. R. 677685. The trial court erred by disregarding BriteSmile's two pleadings and its
affirmative defenses, declaring: "[u]nlike the defendants in Parkwest." the BriteSmile
defendants "never took any measures to 'ensure' that the court knew of their desire to
arbitrate this matter." R. 780.
This case is very much like Parkwest. The Parkwest defendant only
affirmatively raised its right to arbitration in a letter to opposing counsel. 2002 UT 3,
Tf 30. In the instant case, BriteSmile did much more by pleading its right to arbitration
as an affirmative defense. R. 34; R. 360. This is a far more appropriate mechanism to
put the trial court and the plaintiff on notice of BriteSmile's contractual right to
arbitration than any letter to counsel. See Cedar Surgery Center, L.L.C. v. Bonelli.
2004 UT 58, Tl 19, 96 P.3d 911 (noting in dicta that the "ideal" procedure "would have
[been to] raise[] the contractual arbitration clause in an answer to [plaintiffs]
complaint"). Since the letter to counsel employed in Parkwest was enough to defeat a

finding of waiver, the two affirmative pleadings in this case should likewise have
been enough to defeat a finding of waiver. See, e ^ , Tenneco Resins. Inc. v. Davy
M I , 770 F.2d 416, 420 (5th Cir. 1985); Font v. Paine Webber Inc.. 649 F. Supp. 462,
467 (D.C. P.R. 1986) ("[T]he filing of an affirmative defense is not to be taken
lightly,.... A timely defense serves notice on plaintiffs, eliminates the element of
surprise from litigation, and allows the opposing party an opportunity to argue against
iV); G.B. Michael and Genossenschaftkraftfutterwerk. Corp. v. SS Thanasis. 311 F.
Supp. 170, 181 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ("The defendants here clearly and explicitly raised
their claim to arbitration at the very outset of this proceeding by including a request
for same in their answer. Courts have specifically held that this factor alone is
sufficient to defeat a claim of waiver."); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Borden Co..
Inc.. 268 F.Supp. 303, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("Courts in this circuit have consistently
held that there is no waiver when a party demands arbitration for the first time in its
answer.''); University Nursing Assocs. v. Phillips. 842 So.2d 1270, 1276 (Miss. 2003
("Waiver of arbitration is not a favored finding, and there is a presumption against it;
this is particularly true when the party seeking arbitration has included a demand for
arbitration in its answer, and the burden of proof then falls even more heavily on the
party seeking to prove waiver."); Downey v. Christensen. 825 P.2d 557, 558 (Mont.
1992) (recognizing that pleading arbitration as an affirmative defense put the
plaintiffs "on notice of [the defendants'] intent to rely on the arbitration clause . . .
from the outset,'' and holding that "[t]his factor alone sufficiently defeats a claim of
waiver.").

Smile Asia argues that "aside from their affirmative defenses, Defendants
never raised arbitration in any of their motions and memoranda." Brief of Appellee,
26. The flaw of this argument is the obvious fact that BriteSmile did raise its right to
arbitration in its affirmative defenses. R. 34 & 360. A trial court cannot ignore a
defendant's affirmative defenses. Parkwest 2002 UT 3, T^j 33 & 24.
Moreover, the actions taken by the defendant in Parkwest are similar to those
taken by BriteSmile in this case. The Parkwest defendant answered, counterclaimed,
moved to dismiss, held at least one scheduling conference, and participated in
discovery. 2002 UT 3, ^Tj 5, 8, 28, 32. All of this notwithstanding, and even though
the "[defendant's] actions constitute[d] participation in litigation," id, f 28, the
Parkwest Court held that there had been no waiver - and could be none - because the
defendant had raised the issue of its right to arbitration in a letter written to opposing
counsel. Id, ][ 30. The Parkwest Court was compelled to this conclusion by the
"strong policy of the law in Utah in favor of arbitration" and by the "strong
presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate," Id, ^f 24, & ^^ 29-34. "Because
of our strong presumption against waiver in Utah, waiver of the right to arbitrate must
be intentional, and inferring waiver from a party's actions is appropriate only if the
facts demonstrate that the party seeking to enforce arbitration intended to disregard its
right to arbitrate." Id,, Tf 24. In the instant case, as in Parkwest, There is no "intention
to disregard [the] right to arbitration" when that right has been expressly invoked as
an affirmative defense, in a letter, or otherwise.

Also, the fact that there has been some discovery by both sides is not enough to
permit the court to infer a waiver and disregard BriteSmile's affiraiative defenses. "If
participation in discovery and pretrial motions, standing alone, irrespective of the
parties' intentions [as expressed in the letter to counsel], were to constitute waiver of
the right to arbitrate, the strong policy favoring arbitration would be damaged."
Parkwest, 2002 UT, 3, ^ 33; see also. Font v. Paine Webber Inc.. 649 F. Supp. 462,
467 (D.C. P.R. 1986) (compelling arbitration despite discovery and substantial delay);
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Borden Co.. Inc.. 268 F.Supp. 303, 312 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (same); Downey v. Christensen. 825 P.2d 557, 558 (Mont. 1992) (same).
B.

The Cases cited by Smile Asia are
Distinguishable,

Smile Asia relies on three cases from other jurisdictions, but each of these are
distinguishable from Parkwest and the many cases cited above. The case in which
Smile Asia places its heaviest reliance is Mano v. Geissler, 321 F. Supp. 2d 588
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). In Mano, the court found a waiver, in part, precisely because the
defendant had not asserted its right to arbitration in its the answer or elsewhere at the
outset of the case. Id, at 594. Mano is not instructive because it does not deal with the
factual scenario presented here where the right to arbitration is asserted at the outset
of the case in an answer or otherwise.
Smile Asia also relies on Davis v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4th
205 (1997). Reliance on Davis is misplaced because Califomia has a different rule
for waiver than exists in Utah and the other jurisdictions that follow the same rule.
8

Keating v. Superior Court. 109 Cal. App. 3d 784, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 488 (1980)
(examining waiver under federal and state theories, noting differences), rev'd on other
grounds. 31 Cal.3d 584 (1982). This Court should follow the two-pronged Utah rule
as adopted by Chandler and those jurisdictions that have the same rule. It is
particularly appropriate for this Court to follow the federal cases (many cited herein)
that apply this two-pronged analysis. See Buzas Baseball Inc. v. SL Trappers. Inc..
925 P.2d 941, 947 n.5 (Utah 1996) (explaining that Utah courts look for guidance to
federal cases that apply the Federal Arbitration Act because the Utah Act is similar to
the federal act). When Keating applied the federal rule it concluded that there would
be no waiver when the defendant had asserted its right to arbitration in an affirmative
defense. 167 Cal. Rptr. at 488 (noting that when defendant asserts its right to arbitrate
as affirmative defense, "courts have specifically held that this factor alone is sufficient
to defeat a claim of waiver").
Finally, Smile Asia relies on the case of Board of Educ. Taos Mun. Sch. v.
Architects. 709 P.2d 184 (N.M. 1985). Support for BriteSmile's position is found in
this case where the New Mexico court says that "mention of [the right to arbitration]
as an affirmative defense in the answer to a complaint does suffice to keep the right
alive," before going on to determine that under the facts of that case there had been a
waiver. Id. at 187.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BECAUSE SMILE
ASIA NEVER DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WILL
SUFFER ANY REAL PREJUDICE BY
PARTICIPATING IN ARBITRATION.

A motion to compel arbitration can only be denied if "actual prejudice" or
"real harm" will result from the arbitration. Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ^ 19 &
22, 982 P.2d 572; Chandler. 833 P.2d at 359-360. Mere delay alone does not suffice
to show prejudice. Pledger. 1999 UT 54, T| 19 & 22; Chandler. 833 P.2d at 359-36;
Hilti. Inc. V. Oldach. 392 F.2d 368, 371 (1st Cir. 1968); Font v. Paine Webber Inc..
649 F. Supp. 462,466 (D.C.P.R. 1986); Williams Industries. Inc. v. Earth Dev. Svs.
Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 139 (Tx. App. 2003). And because there is a strong policy to
favor arbitration, the required showing under this prong is a heightened standard that
is a "heavy burden" for the party opposing arbitration. See Central Florida Invs. v.
Parkwest Assocs.. 2002 UT 3, ^ 24,40 P.3d 599 (citing Tenneco Resins. Inc. v. Daw
Int'l. AG, 770 F.2d 416,420 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also, Britton v. Co-Op Banking
Group, 916 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990); Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach. 392 F.2d 368, 371
(1st Cir. 1968); Font v. Paine Webber Inc.. 649 F. Supp. 462,466 (D.C.P.R. 1986);
Downey v. Christensen. 825 P.2d 557, 389 (Mont. 1992); Williams Industries. Inc. v.
Earth Dev. Svs. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tx. App. 2003). Even if there has been
a waiver in this case, arbitration is still required because Smile Asia did not meet its
"heavy burden" of demonstrating that it would suffer any "actual prejudice" or "real
harm" in arbitration. Stockton v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887 (2nd Cir.
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1985); Blumenthal-Kahn Elec. Ltd. v. American Home Assurance Co.. 236 F. Supp.
2d 575, 584 (E.D. Va. 2002); InreRolland. 96 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App. 2001).
Smile Asia points to three things: (1) the parties' discovery efforts,
(2) attomeys' fees incurred in the litigation to date (without evidence that there has
been any), and (3) the notion that BriteSmile is somehow "testing the judicial waters."
Brief of Appellee, 31-34. It argues that these things are "prejudice" that prevents
arbitration. Yet, both below and now on appeal. Smile Asia failed to offer even one
example of any tangible or concrete harm that it will suffer by participating in
arbitration.
A.

Discovery Efforts.

The actual discovery undertaken has not been extraordinary. Each side
propounded and responded to two sets of written discovery requests (R. 74-75, 177206, 245, 259, & 365-66), which involved BriteSmile handing over the key to its
document warehouse after the trial court granted a motion to compel awarding
sanctions of $1,330 against BriteSmile for resisting discovery (R. 229, 324-27, & 36264). Smile Asia took five depositions (R. 401, 402, 404, 454, 595, & 598). And
BriteSmile deposed both of Smile Asia's principals - the husband and wife team of
Dr. and Mrs. Tan (R. 743, 1079, 1088).^

Smile Asia disingenuously suggests that it had to incur the cost of bringing
Dr. and Mrs. Tan from Singapore for their depositions here. Brief of Appellee, 33-34.
In fact. Dr. and Mrs. Tan voluntarily made the trip to witness the depositions being
taken by Smile Asia's attorneys. When BriteSmile's counsel learned that the Tans
were going to be present in Salt Lake, he asked to take their depositions while they
11

The trial court erred in believing, as Smile Asia now advocates, that it is the
mere "participation in discovery'' - without looking for actual prejudice caused
thereby - that is all that must be shown to meet Smile Asia's heavy burden of
showing prejudice. Brief of Appellee, 31-32. "Knowing the amount and content of
discovery is important to determining prejudice," one court explained, and because
that discovery "may also be useful for the purpose of arbitration, the court should not
ordinarily infer waiver based upon prejudice." Williams Industries. Inc. v. Earth Dev.
Svs. Corp.. 110 S.W.3d 131, 139-40 (Tx. App. 2003). See also Pennzoil Co. v.
Amold Oil Co.. 30 S.W.3d 494, 499-500 (Tex. App. 2000) (same). This, coupled
with the strong policy favoring arbitration, is why there is such a heavy burden on the
party opposing arbitration to show "actual prejudice or real harm" resulting from the
arbitration. Pledger v. Gillespie. 1999 UT 54, ^ 19 & 22, 982 P.2d 572; Chandler.
833 P.2d at 359-360.
The trial court erred in assuming that there will be no discovery available in
arbitration. This is not true, but Smile Asia suggests that this is "so well-established
that most courts merely note as much in passing." Brief of Appellee, 31. In fact,
many courts have held to the contrary. In Williams, the court cited to the Rules of the
American Arbitration Association ("AAA") and cataloged the fact that these Rules
provide for exchanges of documents and information, identification of witnesses and
exhibits, and even depositions in appropriate cases. 110 S.W.3d at 140. The court
were here so that travel costs could be economized. Although they were initially
uncooperative, the Tans eventually agreed to this. See Addendum 1.
12

concluded that because of this, it was error for a trial court to have denied a motion to
compel arbitration when the plaintiff had not "explain[ed] or show[n] whether what it
had revealed through discovery would differ from what it could produce at
arbitration." Id, (citing to the AAA Construction Industry Arbitration Rules available
online at http://www.adr.org).^ See also Blumenthal-Kahn Elec. Ltd. v. American
Home Assurance Co.. 236 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585-86 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that
arbitration was appropriate because the discovery undertaken in court was similar to
what would be available under AAA Rules); Danny's Constr. Co. v. Birdair. Inc.. 136
F. Supp. 2d 134, 144 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (same). Smile Asia acts as if arbitrations are
done by ambush - they are not.
Furthermore, it is notable that the majority of the discovery complained of by
Smile Asia was its own. Smile Asia cannot be prejudiced by discovery that it
initiated, as if the information it obtained through this effort (after moving to compel)
was something that it did not really need to support its claims. In Downey the court
rejected plaintiffs who took this position, explaining, "The [plaintiffs] were on notice
from the outset and, as a result, any actions they took regarding discovery were taken
at their own risk." 825 P.2d at 558. Similarly, in Lumbermens. the court recognized
that prejudice should not be found when it is the plaintiff that is complaining about its
own discovery. 268 F. Supp. 303 at 313.
The Rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") for Large,
Complex Commercial Disputes apply to this dispute and, like the construction rules in
Williams, these rules do allow for discovery, including depositions. Brief of
Appellants, 18-19 & Addendum 3.
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For these reasons, the parties' "participation in discovery" does not prevent
arbitration or make it prejudicial.
B.

Attorneys^ Fees.

Smile Asia argues that ''Chandler is the only Utah case to address prejudice in
the context of waiver of arbitration" (Brief of Appellee, 29), completely ignoring the
recent and highly pertinent case of Pledger v. Gillespie. 1999 UT 54, 982 P.2d 572.
In Pledger the Utah Supreme Court applied the prejudice prong and reversed a trial
court for making the same mistake as the trial court made here. Pledger held that the
plaintiff had not demonstrated that "he [had] incurred significant expenses in the
district court litigation that would not have been incurred in arbitration." Id., ^^ 22 &
23. As with discovery, it is not enough to merely claim that attorneys' fees have
been incurred. If the plaintiff is going to avoid its obligation to participate in
arbitration, it must demonstrate why those fees will have been wasted if the dispute is
sent to arbitration.
What is remarkable about this case is that while Smile Asia claims generally to
have "expended . . . resources litigating this case," (Brief of Appellee, 33) it could not
offer an affidavit or other evidence of fees incurred, and it never even suggested how
its fees, if any, would be wasted if this dispute is sent to arbitration now. Id.
Without some evidence showing actual prejudice. Smile Asia could not have satisfied
its "heavy burden," and there was no basis for the trial court to deny BriteSmile's
motion to compel arbitration. Pledger v. Gillespie. 1999 UT 54, ^^ 22 & 23, 982 P.2d
572. In Williams Industries, the Texas Court of Appeals explained that:
14

The mere fact that plaintiff has expended funds for legal
fees is insufficient to establish prejudice. In deciding to
initiate and prosecute its lawsuit, plaintiff voluntarily
incurred these expenses and costs. It cannot now be
argued that these self-inflicted wounds establish prejudice.
Nothing before us demonstrates that these same expenses
would not have been incurred during arbitration, or would
not have provided a benefit to plaintiff in resolving this
dispute in that forum
Williams Industries, 1

..

. . mtemal quotations and other notations

OPMM-n^ <. ning i ranswestem Pipeline Co. \. iionze'i: LJU M Cias C^o.. "^0^) ^ '/ '' ^
589, 593 (Tex. App. 1991)).
The only specific attorneys' ices hnnic . v^.ia has pointed iv; .> .i.w ;:>... :-•{)
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These fees cannot be a basis for prejudice because BriteSmile reimbursed them when
it paid the sanction. Smile Asia did not demonstrate any prejudice pertaining to
3t\i^rui^\-S \'^^

• ]i 1 (> :)i i II It ;: I I ;: (1 ^ hc: o it assii i^iiied that th/eii;:; had been soiiie.
C.

Testing the Judicial Waters.

There has been no forum shopping because there has been no substantive
rulings. / \ 11 : iitstaii£i:iiig disco v ei > lias beeiipi odiM:::ed Siiiile \ sia sa;) s that
"Defendants have resisted producing their electronic financial information and
correspondence" (Brief of Appellee, 34), but must admit that this information was in

where the defendant is moving to compel arbitration on the eve of trial. To the
contrary, there remains a substantial amount of discoveiy to be conducted, including
cxpci'i jL^.v ^ J:^

^.. . . - ^ c i a i i j . .
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in c hearing,

when BriteSmile's counsel explained that "there's still at least a year ahead of us in
this litigation," the trial court agreed, noting that: "At this rate, its much more than a
year.'' R. 1162, Tr. page 86, line 23 to page 87, line 1. There has been no testing of
the judicial waters. It is appropriate to send this case to arbitration because there
remains substantial savings to be gained in terms of cost avoidance and time saved.
IV.

SMILE ASIA'S EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
ARGUMENT FAILS.
A.

This Argument is No Different from the
Parkwest Analysis.

This is a new argument that was not relied upon by the trial court in deciding
BriteSmile's motion. This belatedly-advanced, altemative basis for denying
BriteSmile's motion does not need to be considered by this Court because it does not
add anything to the two-pronged waiver and prejudice analysis that the Utah Supreme
Court has already established in Chandler, Parkwest and Pledger. This Court does
not need to create a new doctrine or theory regarding waiver of the right to arbitration.
Even so, this equitable estoppel argument fails on its own merits.
B,

Smile Asia is Barred from Claiming Equitable
Estoppel.

Smile Asia's claim for equitable estoppel fails because it has failed to honor its
contractual obligation to participate in arbitration. "[A] party seeking equity must do
so with clean hands." LHIW. Inc. v. DeLorean. 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988).
Despite Smile Asia's agreement to participate in arbitration, it breached this contract
when it sued BriteSmile pursuing judicial remedies in state court. It similarly
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not honored its commitments, bui ;; row seek„s to use the very fruits of its own noncomplaince as a basis to justii N ii> actions. Utah courts do not allow the equitable
dcn'Jriot* (irr.slii|'^|M I lif he used 1''^, ""Hi"" \\ lio li.'is irriis'.nl 1^. Jiji t"iniil_ ; Sec al. ."V
similar position was taken by the plaintiff in Pledger, and rejected. Pledger v.
Gillespie, 1999 l i :-4. * J L vKJ i _u :• /1 ("We refuse to entertain [plaintiffs]
arguineiits coil.-er'• ^ ' ..::. = •-.:

J
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advanced the litigation in violation of his [ajgreement with [defendant]—^whether
knowingly or not

.") Accordingly, this Court should not apply the doctrine of

eqiti:tiabl(e estoppel i:iith:i s :;.as.e.
C.

Smile Asians Equitable Estoppel Argumeiit l-ails
Because the Elements of The Claim are not
Satisfied.

1he elements of estoppel are not establisht.. .;. :.,... 'wa:->c.
e^t(^ppc^ ir '

,... elements of

- ;idniission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards

asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act,
and (3) injury to such other party resulting iroiii aik; ^ mg me first party to contradict
or repudiate such admission, statement, or act/"' Plaieau Mining Co. v. Utah DIA . of

" This argument also applies to Smile Asia's laches argument contained in
footnote 14. It is Smile Asia who has not honored its commitments, so it cannot now
claim laches. Moreover, as described in part III, supra, BriteSmile has not been
dilatory, and arbitration would not harm Smile Asia. Accordingly, the claim of laches
is not available.
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State Lands & Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 728 (Utah 1990) (quoting Celebrity Club. Inc.
v. Utah Liquor Control Common. 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979)).
BriteSmile's participation in the litigation to date has not been inconsistent
with its right to arbitrate. As discussed above, BriteSmile asserted its right to
arbitration on three separate occasions, and has consistently resisted participation in
this case. R. 34, 360, 677-685. Moreover, Smile's Asia participation in this action
has been wholly voluntary. It instituted the suit, and there is no evidence that Smile
Asia has relied on BriteSmile in any way. Finally, as discussed at length above. Smile
Asia has not been prejudiced in any way by the litigation that has occurred to this
point. Thus, because compelling arbitration will not harm Smile Asia in any way, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply.
CONCLUSION
BriteSmile respectfully requests that this Court enter an order reversing the
opinion of the trial court and holding that, under the facts of this case, BriteSmile did
not waive its right to compel arbitration and there is no evidence that Smile Asia will
suffer prejudice by participating in arbitration. The Court should compel Smile Asia
to participate in arbitration.

18

Dai'.-'.'-

•005

DURH VM l( >IMI S ,\,: IMNFGAR
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David W. Tufts
Chad J. Pomeroy
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
T^O. Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
(801)415-3000
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
BriteSmile Management, Inc. and
BriteSmile, Inc.

[Attachment: Brief on CD ROM]
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of May, 2005,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to be mailed
in the U.S. Mail, first-class, postage prepaid, to the following:
David M. Wahlquist
Merrill F. Nelson
Karina F. Landward
Kirton & McConkie
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
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February 2, 2004
VIA FACSIMTLE
David W Tufts
Durham, Jones & Pinegar
n 1 East Broadway #900
Sail Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Smile lac. Asia Pte. Ltd^ v- Britesmile Management, Inc. at aL
Notices of Deposition of Plaintiffs Dr, Tan and Mrs, Tan

Dr.ir T)A\ Id

I received this morning yonr letter dated January 29, 2004, accojnpanied by Notices of
Deposition for Plaintiff uuader 30(b)(6), for Dr. Tan, and for Mrs, Tan. In those notices, you have
sought to schedule those depositions for Tuesday February 24^ through Friday Fcbruaxy 27^' As
you are aware, we currently have depositions of Defendants scheduled for some and/or ah of
those dates. As we have discussed over the telephone, Dr. and Mrs, Tan are coming to attend the
depositions of the Defendants. The Plaintiff continues to object to any requirement to produce
the Tans in Salt Lake City for deposition. However, as an accommodation, we had indicated a
willingness to have Plaintiffs Dr. and Mrs Tan deposed the same week that defendants'
depositions were taken, if possible,
Pursuant to Plaintiffs 30(b)(6) deposition notices for the Defendants, Defendants
designated three individuals. Plaintiff has also sought to take the deposition of David Cox.
Based upon your representations as to anticipated knowledge and deposition duration as well as
the desires of the deponents, we have been willing to accommodate scheduling some of these
depositions on the same day and even to accommodate the taking of Mr. Cox's deposition m the
evening. We have further expressed a willingness to schedule John Reed's deposition to
commence Tuesday, February 24, 2004, if Mr Reed is available and if we can complete the other
depositions of Defendants' designated witnesses You liavc not 3^et responded to tiiis offer
Yon have requested that Defendants be given four days to take the depositions of the
Plaintiff and Dr & Mrs Tan. We have discussed the practical problem in fhat there may not be
four days available during the week currently scheduled for depositions Again, however, as an
accommodation^ Plaintiff has offered to extend the depositions through Saturday, February 28,

David W. Tufts
Febmaiy 2, 2004
Page 2

2004 in an attempt to facilitate the taking and completion of the depositions of Plaintiff and Dr.
& Mrs. Tan.
Yonr current deposition notices seem to i ^ o r e this history of discussion and proposed
accommodation. In tliis regard^ the current notices are -unreasonable and coDllict with the oilier
depositions scheduled. PlaintifFs Dr. & Mrs. Tan would not be available on some or all of the
dates you have specified as the Tans will be involved in observing the depositions of Defendants
and/or of Mr. Cox.
Sincerely yours^
KIRTOI^ & McCONKTE

fames E. Ellsworth
cc:
733627,1

David M. Wahlquisl

U W OFFICES

KIRTO'N & McCONKIE
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TELECOPIER (801) 3:21-4893
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uAVIDW. TUFTS
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
FAX #:
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FROM;

JAMBS E. ELLSWORTH

y

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET

COMMENTS:
RE: SMILE i. \''i

|i" BmTESMiLE. KI Al

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL OF THE PAGES,
PLEASE CALL OUR,, OFFICE AT (801) 32S^3600 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE,
Thib is a confidential communication nnd is not to be delivered or rend by any person other than the ^iddrcsKce. Fncsimile transmission 1.5 not
intended to -waive the ^ittorney-client privilege or nny other privilege. 11' thii transmi^Hinn is received by miyoiie other than the ftddrc^see^ tlie
recipient 1H requested tn call Kirtori & MeConkie collect ki (801) 32^-3600, and to immediately return this document tu Kirtori &r McConkie by
United Stales mail.
Kirtoii &. McConkie guarantees return postage.

Addendum
2

JONES &
PINEGAR

August 31, 2004
VIA H A N D DELIVERY

James E. Ellsworth
Kirton & McConkie
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Smile Inc. Asia Pte, Ltd, v, BriteSmile Management^ Inc., et al.

Dear James:
Please find enclosed a CD containing four .pst files, which files contain the e-mails the court
ordered our clients to produce for the 5-year period from 1996 through 2001. O u r office
has not received copies of the orders that the Court entered on your motion to compel. If
these have been entered, you are required to serve a copy on us.
Attached is a log of those e-mails that are not being produced because they are protected by
the attorney client privilege. It is our intention to claim this privilege and the attorney work
product priAdlege for all e-mails to which these privileges apply. As you can see, we have
conducted a through privilege review. However, as you know, we were under extreme time
pressure to finish this review and there was a large volume of information to be reviewed.
Under these circumstances, I remind you of your obligation to notify us if you discover that
we have inadvertently disclosed any e-mails that contain privileged or other proprietary
information. (See Stipulation Governing the Disclosure of Confidential and Proprietary
Information and Order Thereon, If 18.)
Finally, please also note that we have designated all of the information on this CD as
"Restricted Information/Attorneys' Eyes Only - Subject to Protective Order."
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to call me.
Sincerely,
DURHAM JONES &JRINEGAR

Chad J.
Enclosure
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